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ZIMBABWE'S LAND RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM: LESSONS
FROM KENYA AND ALGERIA
GARY SAMPLINER*

There are few more dramatic opportunities for change in the
Third World today than those offered in the commercial farming sector
of the newly independent nation of Zimbabwe. Upon its coming to
power in 1980, the majority-ruled government of Robert Mugabe found
itself inheriting the most prosperous and modernized commercial farming system in black Africa. Yet, this system was in large measure
owned and controlled by a mere handful of white farmers, leaving the
vast majority of blacks in a position of bare subsistence on overcrowded, poor quality land. As a result of nearly a century of white
domination and explosive black population growth, rural Zimbabwe
may have provided the world's most staggering contrast between the
rich of one race and the poor of another living side by side.
Mr. Mugabe's party, the Zimbabwe African National Union
(ZANU), came into power in the 1980 elections after taking a leading
role in the long struggle against Rhodesia's Ian Smith regime. "Land
for the People" was the centerpiece of ZANU's campaign. The campaign also featured promises to collectivize agriculture, nationalize the
"commanding heights of the economy," and transfer control of production to workers.'
The new Government recognized, however, that any disturbance of
the largely white-run commercial sector could cause severe disruptions
in Zimbabwe's economy for many years to come. Shortly prior to independence, white farmers produced ninety-two percent of the country's
marketed output.2 These farmers were responsible for an overwhelming
majority of the country's agricultural exports, constituting over forty
percent of the country's total exports.$ It was also estimated that
*
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1. ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION, POLITICAL PROGRAMME, quoted in Bratton,
Development in Zimbabwe: Strategy and Tactics, 19 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 447, 455 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Bratton].
2. R. RIDDELL, THE LAND PROBLEM IN RHODESIA: ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FUTURE 13
(1978) -[hereinafter cited as RIDDELL STUDY].
3. Kinsey, Forever Gained: Resettlement and Land Policy in the Context of National Development in Zimbabwe, 52 AFR. 2, 94 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Kinsey
(1982)]. See also Kinsey, Emerging Policy Issues in Zimbabwe's Land Resettlement
Program, 1 DEV. POL'Y REV. 163 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Kinsey (1983)].
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Zimbabwe's 5000 white farmers employed one-third of the country's
total salaried labor force and supplied half of the rural blacks' food
requirements.4
Carrying out a massive resettlement program in the white areas,
therefore, may be a colossal gamble for the new Government. The
country does possess a number of advantages, however, which were not
possessed by other African countries at independence. These advantages include a well developed agricultural infrastructure (at least in
the white areas), a nucleus of experienced whites and university-educated blacks, and a relatively self-sufficient industrial sector. 5
Zimbabwe is also unique among African countries in one other significant respect-it can benefit from the experiences of other fledgling
countries which have tried similar programs over the past twenty
years.
Some prominent Zimbabweans have stated publicly that the country's development strategy must be based on a thorough study of the
mistakes made by other African countries. 6 This article shares a similar
view, but will also attempt to show how Zimbabwe might profit from
adopting certain successful policies of other African nations. This article will compare and discuss the pertinent resettlement laws of Algeria
and Kenya, and will review the policies they were meant to implement.
Kenya provides an obvious basis for comparison, since at independence it implemented a major resettlement program designed to shift
control of the country's commercial farms from European settlers to
Africans.7 In Kenya, as in Zimbabwe, the colonial agricultural sector
had been dominated by several thousand European settlers. These settlers appropriated the country's best land for themselves and left a
rapidly growing indigenous population to fend for itself on the remaining territory.
Algeria is a less obvious country for comparison, for historical as
well as ethnic and geographic reasons. Since nearly all of the whiteowned farms were abandoned at the time of, or shortly after, independence, Algeria's new Government had no need to concern itself with
the transfer of land ownership from European to indigenous hands. Al4. Bratton, supra note 1, at 457-58.
5. Ross, Zimbabwe's Hopes Dim, Wash. Post, Apr. 27, 1983, at Al, col. 2.
6. See, e.g., Harare Business Herald, May 13, 1982, at 3 (quoting nationalist leader
and businessman Dr. Michael Marvena).
7. A number of commentators have noted the comparisons between Kenya's and
Zimbabwe's resettlement programs. See, e.g., J. HARBESON, LAND AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ZIMBABWE: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 25-26, 29-30 (1981) (paper for the
Agency for International Development) [hereinafter cited as HARBESON (1981)]; RIDDELL
STUDY, supra note 2, at 89-91; Kinsey (1982), supra note 3, at 102.

19831

ZIMBABWE'S RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM

geria's experiences are nonetheless useful for Zimbabweans to consider
because of the similarities between many of the professed policy goals
of the two countries, which had emerged with a similarly structured
colonial agricultural sector at independence.8 After examining the major components of each country's land reform program, this article will
conclude by applying some of Algeria's and Kenya's experiences to
questions likely to be faced by Zimbabwe in the coming years.

I.

BACKGROUND

The new Government was compelled to put major emphasis on its
land resettlement program for two reasons. First, there was tremendous political pressure arising from the inequities of the colonial period
and the guerilla war. Approximately half of the country's land, including most of its best agricultural land, had been taken from its African
inhabitants and placed in the hands of approximately 5000 white farmers by the Land Apportionment Act of 1930. 9 Under this Act, only
whites were allowed to purchase land in the areas designated European
Purchase Areas. In contrast, most of Zimbabwe's rural blacks were consigned to live in the so-called Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs), consisting
mostly of poorer quality land. Although this legally enforced segregation was put to an end by the Land Tenure Amendment of 1977,10 the
intervening time before independence brought little change in the disparities between whites and blacks in land ownership." It was only
natural, therefore, that a primary interest of the black leadership in
civil war was for an end to white domination of the
the Rhodesian
2
land.'
seized
Second, the population on the TTLs, approaching crisis proportions, compelled the new Zimbabwean Government to pursue the resettlement program. If each African cultivator in the TTLs is given
enough arable and grazing land to support his family, the TTLs are
capable of supporting 325,000 families." Instead, by 1977 there were
8.

See infra notes 9, 26.

9. See Land Apportionment Act of 1963, ch. 257, Statute Law of Southern Rhodesia
(rev. ed. 1969). For a history of the British seizures of African land, see R. PALMER, LAND
AND RACIAL DOMINATION IN RHODESIA (1977).

10. See RIDDELL STUDY, supra note 2, at 12.
11. Riddell reveals that only two farms were bought by Africans in Rhodesia in the
first seven months after the 1977 amendments were enacted. Id. at 84.
12. Meister, Zimbabwe: Growth with Justice, Swiss REV. WORLD AFF., Nov. 1981, at
19.
13. Id. at 19, 29. For an earlier estimate, see R. RIDDELL, THE LAND QUESTION (1978)
[hereinafter cited as RIDDELL MONOGR MPHI.
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780,000 families in the tribal areas.' 4 If no change is made in the near
future, the situation may become much worse. A recent World Bank
study estimated that the annual population growth rate of Zimbabwe
for the rest of this century will be the highest in the world.'8
The population pressure has also been causing severe ecological
damage. By 1965, fifty percent of the grazing land in the TTLs was
classified as either bare or heavily overgrazed,' and the cattle population has increased by over seventy percent since that time. 7 One estimate suggests that by 1977, seventeen times as much land in the TTLs
was being cultivated as was ecologically desirable.' 8 Adding to this ecological pressure, there was a need to resettle the 750,000 people who
had been displaced by the war.' 9 Five hundred thousand of these people had been placed in 203 "protected villages" during the war and
were subjected to miserably cramped and disease-ridden living
conditions.20
The Government's hands were by no means untied with respect to
its ability to resettle blacks onto white-owned land. The first constraint
was a legal one embodied in the new Constitution of Zimbabwe, which
effectively gave white farmers the right to compensation for takings of
private property.2 ' The provision giving this right was imposed by the
1978 Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Conference, which was held at
England's Lancaster House, and was agreed to by Zimbabwe-Rhodesia's Smith-Muzorewa government, the United Kingdom and the Patriotic Front (consisting of ZANU and the Zimbabwe African People's
Union (ZAPU), and headed by Joshua Nkomo).2 2 This provision was a
14. Meister, supra note 12, at 29.
15. Knight, The Social and Economic Transformationof Zimbabwe, CURRENT HIST.,
Mar. 1983, at 109.
16. See RIDDELL MONOGRAPH, supra note 13, at 17.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Van der Vat, The Country in Chaos Mr. Mugabe is About to Inherit, The Times
(London), Mar. 31, 1980, at 8, col. 5.
20. Jokonya, The Effects of the War on the Rural Population of Zimbabwe, 5 J. S.
AFR. AFF. 133, 139-40 (1980).
21. ZIMB. CONST. § 16(1).
22. See Documents on the Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Conference, 4 J. S. APR.
AFF. 401 (1979). The provision states:
16. (1) No property of any description or interest or right therein shall be compulsorily acquired except under the authority of a law that(a) requires the acquiring authority to give reasonable notice of the intention to acquire the property, interest, or right to any person owning the
property or having any other interest or right therein that would be affected by such acquisition;
(b) requires that the acquisition is reasonably necessary in the interests of
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chief concession exacted by the whites for a peaceful transition to majority rule. Other constitutional provisions allow for prompt takings of
land with compensation in emergencies, and for receipts of land
purchases from the Government to be remitted overseas unencumbered by any tax or charge.2" Additionally, the Constitution provides
that all amendments to the pertinent constitutional provisions within
ten years of independence must receive approval of 100% of the House
4
of Assembly, which is to include twenty seats reserved for whites.
Compensation of white owners is only the starting point of potential problems for any resettlement program. The more serious long-run
problem is that Zimbabwe's agricultural productivity, upon which the
entire economy heavily relies, could be drastically diminished if the
program is not handled properly. Because the white commercial sector
produces the vast majority of the country's marketed agricultural output, the transformation of the highly productive, capital-intensive
white farms into settlements for black farmers could destroy
Zimbabwe's chance for economic advancement for the rest of this cen25
tury and beyond.

I.

ALGERIA'S LAND REFORMS

A.

The Initial Stages

Although Algeria's precolonial land tenure system differed markedly from those of Kenya and Zimbabwe,26 its agricultural sector went
defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town
and country planning, the utilization of that or any other property for a
purpose beneficial to the public generally or to any section thereof or, in
the case of land that is underutilized, the settlement of land for agricultural purposes;
(c) requires the acquiring authority to pay promptly adequate compensation for the acquisition;
(d) requires that the acquiring authority, if the acquisition is contested, to
apply to the General Division or some other court before, or not later
than thirty days after, the acquisition; and
(e) enables any claimant for compensation to apply to the General Division
or some other court for the prompt return of the property if the Court
does not confirm the acquisition and for determination of any question
relating to compensation, and to appeal to the Appellate Division.
23. Id. § 16(4), (5).
24. Id. §§ 38(1), 52(3) & (4). After a ten-year period has elapsed, only a two-thirds
majority is necessary. Id. § 52(3)(a).
25. For example, on an individual scale, the productivity of white farms was estimated at more than six times the rate of farms in the TTLs for Zimbabwe's staple crop,
maize. See HARRESON (1981), supra note 7, at 19.
26. Before the French conquest in the early nineteenth century, much of Algeria's

N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMp. L.

(Vol. 5

through a similar colonial transformation. When the French took control of Algeria in the early 1830's, they seized most of the country's
highly productive estates, claiming to be legal heir to Algeria's former
governors, the Turks. 27 The French gradually took over other fertile
land in later years. By the time of independence, 22,000 French farmers controlled 2.7 million hectares of the country's best agricultural
land.28 The remainder of the country's usable land continued to be
governed by the various precolonial tenure systems. 29 At this time
there were approximately 630,000 peasant holdings, located on 7.3 million hectares of generally infertile and remote land, as well as a few
large holdings owned by Algerians. 0
The transfer of power in Algeria was an extremely violent one,
having come only after a lengthy and disruptive civil war." After the
final unsuccessful offensive by the French OAS in 1961-1962, ninety
percent of the European settlers in the country abandoned their
farms.3 2 Many of the abandoning settlers, embittered by the circumstances of the war, followed a terre brule policy, destroying all of their
machinery as they left.3 3 The settlers were not the only ones to leave at
the time of independence. The final days of French Algeria were
marked by the departure of most of the country's white urban populaall of its technicians, managers, bureaution, which included virtually
34
crats and entrepreneurs.
Thus, the future fate of Algerian agriculture was highly uncertain
better land consisted of large estates owned by Turks who had governed the country.
The estates were operated under a feudal landlord-tenant system common in the Islamic
world, called the khammassah system. Under this system, the tenants, or khammes,
were supplied with seed and other inputs from their landlord and were then allowed to
keep only one-fifth of the crop they grew. Land controlled by the nomadic Bedouins was
allocated by each sheikh to members of his band, with tribal land left over for communal
grazing. Land controlled by the Berbers was organized under a system of individual
holdings which had become increasingly fragmented over many generations. Finally,
there were also extensive habus, or Islamic religious endowment lands. See P. FOSTER,
LAND REFORM IN ALGERIA 8-10 (1970); Blutstein, The Economy, in ALGERIA: A COUNTRY
STUDY 169 (H. Nelson 3d ed. 1979) (Foreign Area Studies Series).
27. Blutstein, supra note 26, at 166.
28. P. FOSTER, supra note 26, at 13.
29. Id. at 11. It should be kept in mind that most of Algeria's usable land is suitable
only for grazing; only two to three percent of the country's land can be cultivated.
30. Id. at 13.
31. The war left an estimated one million people dead and dislocated at least two
million people from their land into "regroupement" centers. K. GRIFFIN, LAND CONCENTRATION AND RURAL POVERTY 16, 34 (1976).
32. I. CLEGG, WORKERS' SELF-MANAGEMENT IN ALGERIA 40 (1971).
33. P. FosTeR, supra note 26, at 25-26.
34. 1. CLEGG, supra note 32, at 40.
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when independence was declared in 1962. At that time, however, laborers on the formerly French-owned farms spontaneously acted to fill
this breach by taking over management of the farms themselves. This
managerial system, which soon became known by the French term
autogestion, was not formally legalized until the decrees of March
1963, nearly a year after the self-management schemes began to operate. 5 Although autogestion was soon proclaimed as Algeria's model to
the world of socialist democracy in action,3" most of the "spontaneous"
initiatives that brought about self-management were sparked by better-off farm laborers attempting to preserve their jobs and keep squatters off of the former European-held farms.3 7 Indeed, the Government
has been said to have endorsed autogestion only after the fact and as a
fait accompli.38
The legislation setting up the self-managed farms provided that
each farm was to be essentially a cooperative, in which all permanent
workers would be full members and eligible to share in the profits.3 9 All
permanent workers were eligible to vote in the "workers' assembly" for
a "workers' council," which would, in turn, elect a "management committee" and a president. The president was to have day-to-day responsibility for managing the farm, while the managing committee was to
have general oversight responsibility. The Government ministry in
charge of land reform (then called the Office National de la Reforme
Agraire, or ONRA) also appointed a "technical director" to supervise
each farm's technical operations. The operative decrees were vague as
to the division of responsibilities between the technical director and
president." Altogether, the former 22,000 farms were consolidated into
41
approximately 2,300 self-managing units of about 1,000 hectares each.
The property status of the self-managed farms was not resolved
until July 1963, when the Government decreed that all property seized
by or given to "collaborators of colonialism" would become the property of the state.2 This decree was apparently a blatant violation of
article 12 of the Evian Agreements, the legal document that severed
35. See Decrees Nos. 63-88, Mar. 18, 1963; 63-95, Mar. 22, 1963; 63-98, Mar. 25, 1963
(Algeria).
36. See I. CLEGG, supra note 32, at 126 (discussion of socialist objectives of 1964
Charte d'Alger).
37. Id. at 48. See also Blutstein, supra note 26, at 167.
38. See I. CLEGG, supra note 32, at 57-58.
39. See Decree No. 63-98, Mar. 28, 1963, art. 3, 4 (Algeria).
40. See Decree No. 63-95, Mar. 22, 1963. See also Blutstein, supra note 26, at 167
(noting that the management formula for self-managed farms has varied over time and
with farm size, but that the basic formula has remained the same).
41. 1. CLEGG, supra note 32, at 84.
42. Decree No. 63-188, July 26, 1963 (Algeria).
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France's control of Algeria and stipulated 4that
French-owned property
3
could not be taken without compensation.
The Government concentrated its agricultural efforts in the 1960's
on the now socialized "self-managed" sector.4' During this period, the
socialized farms gradually lost their self-managed character and instead came to be controlled by the Government and its appointed representatives.4 5 This trend accelerated after the coup by the
Boumedienne government in 1965. Although Boumedienne was said to
initially support the concept of autogestion, he soon became more interested in emphasizing "state capitalism" in the industrial as well as
the agricultural sectors.4 The prevalent belief in Algiers was that the
socialized farms were too valuable to the national economy to be
wasted on experimentation with self-management, and that solely economic criteria ought to be applied by trained government officials
4 7
instead.
It soon became apparent that the Government's own solution was
deficient in several important respects. First, the Government lacked
its own trained management to run the farms. It could find only 1,200
trained directors to run the 3,000 estates, and only 400 of these had
received more than one year of training.4 ' The Government soon realized how serious this problem was and extended an offer to the former
French settlers, allowing them to return to their farms if they would
share the administration and management with their former employees. None of the former settlers were reported to have accepted this
offer. 49 Moreover, the Government supervisory organs turned out to be
no more competent than the managers of individual farms. These bodies were meant to provide credit, technical assistance and marketing
services, but a combination of delay, sheer incompetence and excessive
43. See Evian Agreements, art. 12, reprintedin Musamirapomwe, The Evian Agreements on Algeria and the Lancaster Agreements on Zimbabwe: A Comparative Analysis, 12 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 153, 168-69 (1982). Article 12 provides: "Algeria will
ensure without any discrimination the free and peaceful enjoyment of patrimonial rights
acquired on its territory before self-determination. No one will be deprived of these
rights without fair compensation previously determined." Id.
44. See P. FOSTER, surpa note 26, at 15-16.
45. One author estimates that only ten to fifteen percent of the farms' management
committees were ever democratically elected. I. CLEGG, supra note 32, at 144-45.
46. Id. at 134-35.
47. The Government's low estimation of the farmworkers' managerial abilities was
not the sole reason for its taking control of the self-managed farms. Another reason was
that Algeria's governing party, the FLN, felt threatened by the country's leading labor
union. The union had been a major force in bringing about worker self-management of
the large estates. Id. at 118.
48. K. GRIFFIN, supra note 31, at 30.
49. P. FOSTER, supra note 26, at 26.
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restrictions often resulted in farms being unable to receive credit or
market their crops."
The Government was not only short of trained directors, but those
it could find often lacked the necessary commitment to make the farms
productive. The managers tended to be easily amenable to corruption
and nepotism. A number of the large estates were broken up for the
benefit of former combatants for the ALN, while many others were
managed by caids, indigenous leaders chosen by the French who distributed favors to establish their position."
From the workers' perspective, the coming of so-called autogestion
made very little difference. Although the directives which set up the
new farms called for incentive plans for the workers, such bonuses and
profit sharing were rarely, if ever, received. Instead, administrative expenses swallowed up farm revenue. 2 The lack of any significant salary
differentials between the highest-paid supervisors and lowest-paid
farm workers may also have contributed to a distinct lack of enthusiasm among the peasantry.5 3 Other reasons for this lack of interest may
have been the workers' continued preoccupation with simply retaining
their jobs, their alienation from the central government bureaucrats
who controlled the farms, and the suddenness and lack of preparation
behind the change to autogestion, giving workers an inadequate sense
of identification with the new farms.
For all of these reasons, agricultural production stagnated
throughout the 1960's, averaging no more than ninety percent of the
1957-1959 levels.54 Moreover, the growth in population during this period resulted in a swell of rural unemployment (estimated at fifty percent), which was well beyond the capacity of the already overstaffed
socialized farms to handle. 5 Consequently, the second stage in Algeria's land reform, known as the Agrarian Revolution, was begun with a
barrage of fanfare in 1971.
50. See I. CLEGG, supra note 32, at 154-57. Reports of incompetent management of
the state farm sector have continued to the present day. For example, a recent government study found that although its recent mechanization program has delivered an impressive number of tractors to Algerian farms, the lack of a viable supporting strategy for
appropriate usage of machinery has resulted in no discernable increase in agricultural
production. See Alg~rie S6lction (Paris), No. 56, June 29, 1983, at 2-3.
51. I. CLEGG, supra note 32, at 153, 167-68.
52. Id. at 159.
53. See K. GRIFFIN, supra note 31, at 30. See also Mauge, Ou Sont les oranges
d'Algerie?, PARIS-MATCH, Apr. 26, 1976, at 48, translated in Joint Publications Research
Service (J.P.R.S.) 64947.
54. P. FOSTER, supra note 26, at 52-53.
55. Id. at 52. See also Knauss, Algeria's "Agrarian Reuolution": Peasant Control or
Control of Peasants? 20 AFR. STUD. REV. 62, 65 (1977).
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The Agrarian Revolution

The objectives of the new land reform were set forth in the Charter of the Agrarian Revolution, made into law under Ordinance No. 7173 on November 8, 1971, and signed by President Boumedienne."
They include the reclamation of eroded and abandoned land, the lowering of rural unemployment, the satisfaction of domestic food needs,
an extension of the market for domestically manufactured items and a
redrawing of the boundaries of private farms based on rational standards. 7 Many of the reforms undertaken in the Agrarian Revolution
are beyond the scope of this article." Several reforms are pertinent to
the choices open to Zimbabwe, however, and will be described below.
One of the major reforms adopted was designed to correct the substantial disparities in land ownership existing in the private sector.5
The first step taken was to abolish the khammassah system of sharecropping. 0 Between 1972 and 1973, three million hectares of stateowned land, nomadic land and Islamic-owned land were made available. Only one-fourth of this land was actually redistributed to 60,000
families, mostly on government-sponsored cooperatives."' In the second
stage, which took place between 1973 and 1915, the absentee ownership
of more than five hectares of dry land or one-half hectare of irrigated
land was prohibited.6 2 The Government found to its surprise that less
than one percent of private farms were owned by absentee farmers in
urban areas, and therefore decided to include as "absentee" landowners all those in rural areas who did not perform manual labor on their
farms. Another 650,000 hectares were recovered and redistributed in
this phase of the reform.6 3
56.
57.

J. RAPUBLIQUE ALGARIENNE, No. 97, at 1270, 1281 (Nov. 30, 1971).
See ALGERIAN MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE, THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 22-24 (1973). See also Blutstein, supra note 26, at 169.
58. The legal framework of the Agrarian Revolution is exceedingly complex. It consists of 42 different statutes and regulations, 35 decrees, four executive decisions, and
three ordinances. ALGERIAN MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE, supra note 57, at
38.
59. It was estimated in 1964-65 that while four percent of the private landholdings
occupied 38 percent of total private land, 424,000 peasant families, or 72 percent of all
landowners, had plots of less than 10 hectares, estimated by the Charter of the Agrarian
Revolution to be the minimum landholding to sustain a family. Moreover, 500,000 families were said to be landless. See Sutton, Agrarian Reform in Algeria-The Conversion
of Projects into Action, 1 AFRIKA SPEKTRUM 45, 50 (1974); Blutstein, supra note 26, at
168.
60. See supra note 26.
61. Blutstein, supra note 26, at 169.
62. K. GRIFFIN, supra note 31, at 19. See also Blutstein, supra note 26, at 169.
63. Blutstein, supra note 26, at 170.
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During this stage, the Government also enforced general land ownership ceilings. These varied according to the type of crops grown on
each parcel of land, and were based on government calculations of the
amount of land necessary to give a family an income equal to three
times the salary on an autogestion farm, or 9,000 dinars (approximately U.S. $2,250) per year. 4 Compensation for this land, as well as
for expropriated absentee holdings, was paid in treasury bonds receiving 2.5% interest and payable in fifteen equal annual installments. Indemnities were to be paid based on the valuations given for the land
tax prior to the Agrarian Revolution."6
Altogether, 1.23 million hectares were redistributed during the
first four years of the program to 5,295 cooperative-type groups with
84,833 family members, as well as 5,550 individual landholders (who
owned only three percent of the allocated land)." In addition, the Government began an ambitious program to build 1,000 model rural "Socialist Villages," each of which was to contain central educational and
shopping facilities and new houses with electricity and running water
for 120 to 150 families. All of the villages were originally scheduled for
completion by 1976,67 but by 1979, only 120 villages had been
completed."
Reports on the Agrarian Revolution since the middle 1970's indicate that both the first and second land reform plans have yet to
achieve significant results. The "Agrarian Revolution" sector, consisting of 800,000 hectares of land in cooperatives, lagged far behind both
the socialized sector and the private sector in producing grains.6 9 According to a recent government announcement, a number of cooperatives have failed and are now governmentally controlled. 0 The same
governmental domination, corruption and inefficiency that has crippled
64. Sutton, supra note 59, at 58. This amount would be increased to 13,500 dinars for
a family with children. Id.
65. Id. at 59.
66. Karsenty, Development of Algerian Agricultural Policy Examined, PAris
MAGHREB-MACHREK, July-Sept. 1977, at 31-39, translated in J.P.R.S. 69,981, at 10. A
three level structure of cooperatives has been set up for beneficiaries of the program. In
the predominant type, members group together land and means of production and collectively farm the land, with income divided according to the hours worked. In the other
two types, workers own the land and keep their own production, but must follow a common production plan. See Sutton, supra note 59, at 61-62.
67. Knauss, supra note 55, at 73.
68. Sutton, The Socialist Villages of Algeria, 4 THIRD WORLD PLANNING REV., 247,
251 (1982) (hereinafter cited as Sutton (1982)].
69. Arabia, ISLAMIC REV., Jan. 1982, No. 5, at 56, reprinted in J.P.R.S. 80,486. In fact,
the private sector was recently reported to have produced two thirds of the country's
agricultural output. See Arabia, IsLxmic REv., Sept. 1983, No. 25, at 52-53.
70. El Moudjahid (Algiers), Oct. 5, 1982, at 3, translated in J.P.R.S. 82,403.
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the socialized sector has hampered the growth and marketing of crops
in the cooperatives." Abandonment rates from cooperatives have been
estimated to range from ten to seventy-five percent; a government report admitted that seven percent of the land granted through 1973 was
abandoned." Even in the model Socialist Villages, dropout rates were
said to exceed twenty percent. Participating peasants, considering
themselves to be no better than khammes of the state, resented paying
for high-priced food and rent."
After twenty years of land reforms, the overall agricultural statistics for Algeria looked grim. From 1966 to 1977, while the population
grew 3.2% annually, food production grew only two percent; production of grain and wine, the country's two major agricultural products,
was lower in absolute terms than in 1954.1" The trend toward greater
food importation may be Algeria's most alarming statistic. Although
the country was once self-sufficient in food, imports accounted for
twenty-seven percent of total consumption in 1969 and seventy percent
in 1982. 71 Food imports took up forty-five percent of the country's oil
and gas earnings in 1974.78
Nonetheless, these dismal production figures do not necessarily indicate that the Algerian Government's agricultural policies were fundamentally misguided. The gross production figures did increase steadily
over that period in spite of the lack of additional fertile land on which
to place new settlements and the loss of over sixty percent of the country's agricultural machinery, as well as over half the country's livestock, at independence." Moreover, the country was faced with the loss
of its major market for wine, Algeria's primary agricultural export,
when the French substantially eliminated Algerian wine imports in the
1960's. Furthermore, it is important to realize that the lack of interest
in agriculture exhibited by the Government and the peasants was
caused in part by the expectation of great benefits to be derived from
industrialization and the exploitation of oil and gas. The Boumedienne
government, in particular, tended to downgrade the importance of agricultural expenditures in favor of becoming the "Japan of Africa"
71.
72.
at 258
land).
73.
74.
75.
Wash.
76.
77.

Knauss, supra note 55, at 73-76.
Id. at 73; Blutstein, supra note 26, at 171; see also Sutton (1982), supra note 68,
(noting one instance in which 298 of the original 310 beneficiaries deserted their
See Knauss, supra note 55, at 74.
219 El Djeich (Algiers), Aug. 1981, at 17-18, translated in J.P.R.S. 79,309.
Karsenty, supra note 66, at 13; Randal, Algeria Keeps Left by Easing Right,
Post, Mar. 9, 1983, at A18, col. 3.
Mauge, supra note 58, at 49.
I. CLEGG, supra note 32, at 85; K. GRIFFIN, supra note 31, at 34.
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through oil-financed industrialization. 8
Finally, the country did make substantial progress in reducing the
gaps between the rural rich and poor. For example, it was reported
that eighty percent of the country's "large" farms (containing over 110
hectares) were divided into holdings of less than five hectares and
redistributed to poor peasants.79 Those workers who remained on the
socialized farms may have also received the benefit of wages which
were higher than those received under French rule.80
III.
A.

LAND RESETTLEMENT IN KENYA

The Land Situation Before Independence

The traditional land reform system in Kenya varied according to
tribe and region, but was generally similar to the system prevailing in
Zimbabwe.81 Ownership of land rested in the hands of each tribe rather
than in individuals. The cropland in each area was allocated to individual families, and this land was farmed and subdivided over succeeding
generations. Grazing land was shared communally,8 2 and an elaborate
system of squatters' land rights was developed in some tribes to help
redistribute excess people from one group to another.83 Some of the
less populous pastoral tribes, such as the Masai, moved seasonally from
one area to another with their livestock, and could only be said to have
had a loose form of group tenure over their traditional lands.
The colonial era in Kenya caused massive repercussions on this
traditional land tenure system. The British took over 3.1 million hectares of the country's best agricultural land, which they named the
White Highlands, and created a highly prosperous system of mixed
farms, ranches and plantations.8 4 All other lands were set aside and
78. See Knauss, supra note 55, at 65-66; Randal, supra note 74.
79. Knauss, supra note 55, at 75.
80. This assertion is difficult to verify. Even though salaries on the socialized farms
were reported to have increased by 100 percent from 1971 to 1976, inflation resulted in a
price increase of somewhere between 50 and 125 percent during this period. Karsenty,
supra note 66, at 11.
81. For a description of similar features prevailing in Zimbabwe, see HARBESON
(1981), supra note 7, at 8-10, and sources cited therein.
82. For a detailed description of traditional land tenure practices in Kenya, see
Coldham, The Effect of Registration of Title upon Customary Land Rights in Kenya, 22
J. AFR. L. 91 (1978); Okoth-Ogendo, African Land Tenure Reform, in AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA: AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 152, 152-56 (J. Heyer ed. 1976).
83. See, e.g., Odenyo, Conquest, Clientage, and Land Law among the Luo of Kenya,
7 L. & Soc. REV. 767, 772-73 (1973).
84. Although there were only 61,000 Europeans in Kenya in 1960 (as compared to 7.8
million Africans), they produced an estimated 90 percent of the country's agricultural
output. See A. HAZLEWOOD, THE ECONOMY OF KENYA: THE KENYATTA ERA 7 (1979).
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divided among the African tribes for their use as so-called "Reserves."
Although the British planners initially believed that adequate land had
been set aside for the Africans, many areas in the Reserves became
overcrowded and overgrazed. The fear of encroachment from Europeans and other Africans and the consequent desire for increased land
security led to the creation of rudimentary systems of individual land
tenure by tribes such as the Kikuyu."6
After the Mau Mau uprising in 1952, thought to be caused largely
by land pressures from disgruntled Kikuyu, s6 the British realized that
major changes were needed in Kenya's land policies. They ultimately
utilized a two-prong strategy advocated in 1954 by the East Africa
Royal Commission, headed by Lord Swynnerton.8 7 The first prong of
the strategy became known as the Swynnerton Plan, and was implemented beginning in 1955. The Swynnerton Plan represented the view
that in order for agricultural improvement to take place in the
Reserves, credit had to be made available to progressive African farmers to allow them to acquire more land and make improvements. The
consolidation, enclosure and registration of title were considered necessary to make this credit obtainable.8 8
The second prong of the Commission's recommendations-the
transfer of European-owned land to Africans for settlement-was not
implemented until 1960. Curiously enough, the resettlement programs
were initially proposed by white members of Kenya's Legislative Council. 9 Once these proposals were aired, momentum to implement them
built rapidly. In the early 1960's, some of the more conservative set85. See Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 82, at 158; Harbeson, Land Reforms and Politics
in Kenya, 1954-70, 9 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 231, 234 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Harbeson
(1971)]. See also C. LEYS, UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN KENYA 66 (1975).
86. See Leo, The Failure of the "Progressive Farmer" in Kenya's Million Acre Settlement Scheme, 16 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 619, 620 (1978).
87. See EAST AFRICA ROYAL COMMISSION, A PLAN TO INTENSIFY THE DEVELOPMENT OF
AFRICAN AGRICULTURE IN KENYA (1954), cited in A. HAZLEWOOD, supra note 84, at 9.
88. See A. HAZLEWOOD, supra note 84, at 9. The laws resulting from the Swynnerton
Plan are presently codified in the Land Titles Ordinance, cap. 282 and the Land Adjudication Act, caps. 283, 284, LAWS OF KENYA (1982).
89. See J. HARBESON, NATION-BUILDING IN KENYA: THE ROLE OF LAND REFORM 91-97
(1973) [hereinafter cited as J. HARBESON (1973)]. Liberal and conservative whites each
had their own reasons for supporting a resettlement program. The liberals believed that
gradual resettlement was a means of preserving free enterprise and holding onto some of
their property, which they could hopefully retain as concessions in return for the granting of independence and part of the White Highlands. The conservatives wished at first
to preserve their agricultural assets, but subsequently believed that the cause was lost.
Instead, they backed expensive guaranteed buy-out schemes to be completed preferably
before independence. See Wasserman, The Independence Bargain: Kenya Europeans
and the Land Issue, 11 J. COMMONWEALTH POL. STUD. 99, 102-05 (1973).
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tiers threatened to abandon their farms if they were not assured the
ability to sell them at a good price before independence. A number of
these settlers followed through on their threats." Kenya's black nationalist leaders in turn were said to have had misgivings about financing an expensive buy-out scheme for land which was taken from them
in the first place. Nonetheless, they ultimately acquiesced to the Commission's proposals in order to receive these lands intact and insure
that independence would not be delayed. 9'
The first small land resettlement program began in 1961, largely as
a result of this compromise. By the following year, squatters were moving onto European lands in large numbers and the land market had
substantially collapsed.9 2 Black and white leaders soon agreed on the
necessity for a more rapid resettlement program. A new program
known as the Million Acre Scheme was first introduced in 1962, one
year before independence.
B.

The Million Acre Scheme

British land planners had originally intended the new scheme to
divide land into relatively large plots to be owned by wealthier and
more experienced "progressive" farmers. These wealthier farmers were
thought to be the only Africans capable of keeping the former European farms commercially viable. Instead, political imperatives for
broader redistribution compelled the Government to divide the land
into smaller plots.9 3 Under the resulting scheme, 29,000 families were
settled on "high-density" plots forecast to produce an annual income
of £25-40 after subsistence needs were taken care of, and 5,000 families
were settled on "low-density" plots intended to produce an income of
£100."' The land for the Million Acre Scheme was purchased on a willing-seller, willing-buyer basis over the course of five years at prices
prevailing in 1959, the last year in which there was thought to be a free
market in land."5 Although various governments as well as the World
90. Harbeson (1971), supra note 85, at 240-41.
91. J. HARBESON (1973), supra note 89, at 98-100.
92. C. HOLTHAM & A. HAZLEWOOD, AID AND INEQUALITY IN KENYA 107 (1976).
93. J. HARBESON (1973), supra note 89, at 241.
94. C. LEYS, supra note 85, at 74-75. Although Kenya's planners acknowledged that
the income targets for the low-density schemes were "desperately small," they pointed to
examples where the land was properly farmed by "energetic farmers" who produced ten
times that amount. See P. ABRAMS, KENYA'S LAND RESETTLEMENT STORY 24 (1979).
95. J. HARBESON (1973), supra note 89, at 222-23. Valuation of this land was performed by expatriate personnel from the Land Development and Settlement Board. The
Board was thought to represent the interests of the white farmers. See Leo, supra note
86, at 625; C. HOLTHAM & A. HAZLEWOOD, supra note 92, at 110. Leys corroborates this
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Bank provided development loans, outside financing for the land
purchases came from the British Government. 6 The British Government provided a grant for one-third of the value of the land purchase
and lent the remaining amount to the Kenyan Government. The terms
of the loan provided for 6.5% interest, payable over a thirty-year period. The Kenyan Government in turn extended the same loan terms
97
to the new settlers.
Selection of settlers for the high-density schemes was made by local committees of the Land Settlement Board, and was based on the
character of the settlers, their ethnic background, and their employment and landholding status (only the unemployed and landless were
eligible). All new settlers were required to sign a Letter of Allotment,
which promised them freehold tenure once a number of conditions
were met. These conditions included repayment of the loans (so that
none of the settlers could own their plots for at least thirty years), personal residence on the plots, farming the plots according to rules of
good husbandry as determined by the trustees, and paying all taxes
and assessments charged against the land. Failure to comply with these
conditions could result in the trustees' spending the necessary funds
and charging them, with interest, to the settler. Noncompliance could
ultimately result in eviction if no payment was made after due warning. Settlers had no legal recourse if the trustees attempted to recall
loans or repossess plots. The settlers were also required to accept development loans in varying amounts in order to develop the land."
Stricter criteria based on previous farming experience and financial resources were used in selecting settlers for the low-density schemes.9
C. Subsequent Resettlement Efforts
In 1965, once the Million Acre Scheme was nearing completion,
the Government undertook a reevaluation of its land settlement proobservation by noting that the average price paid under the Million Acre Scheme was
substantially higher than that paid by companies and individuals in private transactions
over the same period. C. LEYS, supra note 85, at 85 n.63.
96. C. HOLTHAM & A. HAZLEWOOD, supra note 92, at 109-10; C. LEYS, supra note 85,
at 70.
97. The one-third grant component was thought to cover the cost of the buildings as
well as other improvements which were considered not to be capable of generating income for the new settlers. P. ABRAMS, supra note 94, at 9-10.
98. J. HARBESON (1973), supra note 89, at 281-82. Cooperative societies were another
integral element of the schemes. Although membership in these societies was voluntary,
100 percent of the members of most schemes joined. Membership was necessary because
essential services were provided, such as dip cleansing for cattle, the lack of which could
be grounds for repossession of animals by the Settlement Department. Id. at 286.
99. P. ABRAMS, supra note 94, at 29-30.
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posals. It was assisted by a British commission headed by the economist Maxwell Stamp. The Stamp Mission, as it became known, concluded that further resettlement programs would "saddle Kenya with a
heavy debt burden and the UK with a heavy aid commitment for little
economic advantage, in order to relieve political pressures which
should be tackled in other ways." 100 Over the next decade, the Government followed many of the Stamp Mission's recommendations and distributed most of the remaining large European mixed farms intact,
through private sales. 0 1 Most of these farms became the property of
groups ranging in size between two and 11,000 members and organized
in the form of partnerships or "land-purchase cooperatives." Since
very few individuals were capable of raising the required down payment of twenty to forty percent on farms averaging 600 hectares in
size, these groups were generally formed for the purpose of buying land
rather than farming it cooperatively. In later years increasingly fewer
cooperatives succeeded in acquiring land. The cooperatives were either
poorly managed or unable to convince the Land Bank (which provided
the necessary credit) to deal with them.0 2
The Government also initiated two other major land resettlement
programs in the middle 1960's. One of these programs, the Haraka Settlement Schemes (initially known as the Squatter Settlements), was
implemented on white-owned farms taken over by the Government
under section 187 of the Agriculture Act.' 0 3 Under this law, the Minister of Agriculture has the power to expropriate inadequately managed
or supervised land which he can then either sell or operate, with the
owner receiving compensation from the proceeds or directly from the
Government. Beginning in 1965, the Government appointed a Commissioner of Squatters to settle land taken over under this Act by registering and giving private plots to people who could prove they were landless. Approximately 45,000 people registered, and eventually 14,635
families were settled on plots averaging about four hectares in size.'0 4
The second type of scheme was called a shirika scheme, under
100.

REPORT OF THE MISSION APPOINTED TO ADVISE ON PROPOSALS FOR A FURTHER

TRANSFER OF EUROPEAN FARMS IN KENYA

3 (1965), quoted in C.

LEYS,

supra note 85, at

86.
101. See A. HAZLEWOOD, supra note 84, at 33.
102. C. LEYS, supra note 85, at 90-91.
103. Agriculture Act, No. 8, cap. 318, § 187 (1955).
104. C. HOLTHAM & A. HAZLEWOOD, supra note 92, at 116-17. The Government did
not initially follow the terms of the Act; it did not compensate owners for seized land.
The British Government complained about the action and eventually the High Court of
Kenya ruled that the Government had to compensate the owners for the full cost of their
land, plus a 15 percent surcharge. New Munya Sisal Estates v. Attorney General, E. AYR.
L. REP. 88 (1969).
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which the Government purchased large farms to run as cooperatives.
Under the shirika schemes, landless and unemployed people have been
settled on the farms along with the former employees. Each family received a one hectare plot. The rest of each farm functioned as a large
farm, managed by an appointee of the Settlement Fund Trustees, for
which the members worked for wages.108 The members of each farm
formed a cooperative society, which was able to either purchase the
farms with the aid of a government loan or hold the land on a lease,
paying an annual rent of five percent of the land's value. Ultimately,
the management of each farm is designed to be transferred to each
farm's cooperative society, although reportedly this has not yet happened." 6 This method of organization was intended to assist large
numbers of new settlers and at the same time maintain the economies
of scale and capital equipment of the large farms.
Statistics for the purpose of evaluating these schemes are still
sketchy, but certain trends can be discerned from available data. First,
none of the schemes have fully met the expectations of their planners.
For example, even though the "principal objective" of the Million Acre
Scheme was to maintain at least the same amount of production in the
new settlements as was achieved under the Europeans, the settlements
accounted for barely half the amount of marketed output in 1969-1970
which the Europeans had produced ten years earlier.0' Another indication of the lower than expected performance of the programs was the
fact that loan repayments amounted to only forty to sixty percent of
In fact, the
the total debt incurred through the end of the 1960's.'
continued inability of settlers to repay their loans in the 1970's
threatened the solvency of the country's entire land resettlement
program.' 09
Second, it appears that the smaller high-density plots have outperformed the larger low-density plots, contrary to the expectations of
the British and World Bank planners who stressed the need to resettle
the more experienced and better-off "progressive" farmers. According
to a much-quoted survey taken by the Kenyan Government in 1971,
the gross output per hectare of settlement farms of less than four hectares was more than double the output of settlement farms larger than
four hectares, and was almost six times the output of settlement farms
105. See Nairobi Development Plan 1974-1978, at 229, cited in C. HOLTHAM & A.
HAZLEWOOD, supra note 92, at 114.
106. C. HOLTHAM & A. HAZLEWOOD, supra note 92, at 114-15.
107. J. HARBESON (1973), supra note 89, at 241; C. LEYS, supra note 85, at 75-76.
108. Leo, supra note 86, at 637.
109. See A. HAZLEWOOD, supra note 84, at 122.
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larger than thirty hectares." ° This result is all the more startling considering the fact that low-density schemes received comparatively better tracts of land, better access to credit and extension services, and
Disappointing
more administrative protection against squatters."1
production figures have also been noted on the large farms purchased
privately by Africans despite similar advantages which the larger private farms have received."1 2
This trend has been explained as the result of the greater motivation to succeed exhibited by those settlers on high-density plots."'
Many high-density settlers were subjected to appalling conditions as
squatters or resistance fighters and appear to perceive the settlement
schemes as an opportunity of a lifetime. 14 Low-density settlers, on the
other hand, had already achieved some degree of economic success. To
many of them their new plots were merely portfolio investments. In
one survey of low-density plotholders, for example, it was discovered
that thirty percent of these settlers were employed elsewhere for
wages, and that one-third of the plots were owned by absentee
landlords.'
The problems the land schemes faced were most severe in the privately purchased, larger farms. Output on these farms dropped to
about a third of their former levels, and arrears on debts rose far above
the levels reached by the settlement schemes.' The primary economic
problem according to Kenya's 1966-1970 Development Plan, was that
"most of [the large farmowners] had to devote nearly all their savings
to purchasing their farms, which left them with very little working cap-

110.

KENYA MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND PLANNING, STATISTICS DIVISION, AN ECONOMIC

(1971), cited in INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZAA STRATEGY FOR INCREASING PRODUCTIVE
EMPLOYMENT IN KENYA 167 (1972) [hereinafter cited as ILO Study]. The same study revealed that although the net profit per hectare was initially smaller in the high-density
schemes, it surpassed that of low-density schemes by 1967-68. See Leo, supra note 86, at
632-33.
111. Leo, supra note 86, at 631-34.
112. Hinga & Heyer, The Development of Large Farms, in AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA: AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT, supra note 82, at 222, 248-49; see also ILO
Study, supra note 110, at 166.
113. Leo, supra note 86, at 635-37.
114. Id. at 637. This was not always the case-13.3% of the high density settlers did
not even qualify as landless or unemployed. Id.
115. Id. at 636. The author notes that the comparative figures for "non-progressive"
farmers in the same survey were 7.5 percent and 7.6 percent, respectively. Another survey of farms larger than three hectares in the Central Province found that 90 percent of
them had absentee landlords. See Wright, What Went Wrong with the Picture of Success, SOUTH, Dec. 1982, at 37.
116. C. LEYS, supra note 85, at 92.
APPRAISAL OF THE SETTLEMENT SCHEMES
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ital to operate their farms efficiently.""' 7 In addition, although the
farms differed greatly in size and type of ownership (many were owned
by absentees, while others were mass-membership cooperatives), they
seemed to have one trait in common. As one commentator found:
It was not just that the technical know-how to run the farms
profitably was lacking, but much more importantly, the initial
bond that had brought the new "settlers" together-the drive
to get on the land-did not afford any basis for discipline or
mutual trust or leadership which could be the basis of a collective effort to work the farm back into production and meet its
financial obligations."'
The pervasive trend in these large private farms has been to subdivide, generally after all loans are repaid. (If this subdivision takes
place earlier, all loans have to be apportioned among the members.)
More often than not, the income for loan repayments has come from
members' outside income."' The nonviability of these larger units has
been recognized by both the Government and international agencies.
In fact, the Government recently announced its intention to split up all
20
large cooperatives.
Many of the same problems of the large farms and government
settlements have also been noted in the shirika schemes. Labor requirements in the group area of the farms often have not been sufficient to keep all farm members employed. Instead, most of the jobs
have gone to those with specialized skills, such as tractor drivers and
mechanics.' 2' Disillusionment has also been reported from workers on
the schemes, who have often considered themselves to be only tenants
on "government farms." These workers have thus put most of their
122
efforts into their own plots rather than those of the community.
Nonetheless, the shirika schemes are still reported to be running
smoothly. They may be the only type of scheme possible in which the
landless can be settled without destroying the large-scale, capital-intensive agriculture thought necessary for growing crops such as wheat
2
in Kenya." 3
DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1966-70, at 155, quoted in C. LEYS, supra note 85, at 92.
C. LEYS, supra note 85, at 93.
Hinga & Heyer, supra note 112, at 249.
WORLD BANK, KENYA: INTO THE SECOND DECADE 473-74 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as WORLD BANK KENYA REPORT]; ILO Study, supra note 110, at 169; A. HAZLEWOOD,
supra note 84, at 49. See also The Kenya Times (Nairobi), June 2, 1983, at 6, col. 1.
121. C. HOLTHAM & A. HAZLEWOOD, supra note 92, at 115.
122. P. ABRAMS, supra note 94, at 44.
123. ILO Study, supra note 110, at 168.
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The Haraka schemes seem to be the most successful of the different systems in effect in Kenya, at least from a cost-benefit perspective.
These schemes were the least costly of all the schemes to implement,
yet they have now resulted in 14,000 families growing crops on 105,000
hectares of land that was formerly not being put to good use. 2 4 Moreover, some Haraka settlers were reported to achieve yields as high as
those of high density settlers despite receiving fewer extension services,
no special credit or high-grade cattle and inferior infrastructural facilities. 25 Indeed, a recent World Bank report on Kenya recommended
the expansion
of Haraka-type settlement schemes on relatively unused
26
trust lands.

Although the overall agricultural picture for Kenya still contains
some nagging problems after these reforms, the picture is generally
favorable compared to many other African countries. Kenya was able
to turn over much of its largely white-run agriculture to blacks while
increasing its agricultural output at an absolute rate of four percent in
the 1970's. Along with Malawi, Kenya achieved the second highest
growth rate in Africa during this period.127 Nonetheless, this corresponds to a growth rate of only 0.6% per capita, which essentially puts
the country in the same gross agricultural position it had in 1970.12"
Kenya has also had the advantage over both Algeria and Zimbabwe of
having excess unused tribal land on which to expand production. 29
On the other hand, Kenya's resettlement program (or more accurately, its abandonment of the resettlement program after the Million
Acre Scheme) may have sown the seeds of a long-term problem that
will be difficult to remedy-the creation of a black land-owning aristocracy. Although the various smallholder schemes resulted in at least
50,000 families becoming able to own land for the first time, the private sale of white lands to Africans allowed, for the first time, a group
of Africans with modest amounts of wealth to gain substantial parcels
of land. As Kenya's land credit program grew, the ranks of credit recip124. See A. HAZLEWOOD, supra note 84, at 33; C. HOLTHAM & A. HAZLEWOOD, supra
note 92, at 117.
125. C. HOLTHAM & A. HAZLEWOOD, supra note 92, at 117-18.
126. WORLD BANK KENYA REPORT, supra note 120, at 474-75.
127. WORLD BANK, ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: AN AGENDA
FOR ACTION 167 (1981) [hereinafter cited as WORLD BANK AFRICA REPORT]. Agricultural
production grew at a slightly higher rate (4.5%) from 1964 to 1969. C. LEYS, supra note
85, at 114.
128. In fact, the country has recently lost its longstanding self-sufficiency in food production. See Wright, supra note 115, at 37. In the past year, the food situation in Kenya,
like that in many other African countries, has worsened considerably, due primarily to
drought. See NEWSWEEK, Nov. 26, 1984, at 54.
129. See WORLD BANK KENYA REPORT, supra note 120, at 461-69.
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ients became increasingly limited to a small number of people with a
proven ability to pay. This gave a further advantage to those who had
accumulated modest amounts of wealth.130 There is little doubt that
these programs have exacerbated the disparities in rural wealth in Kenya. By 1982, five percent of the landowners were found to own seventy percent of the land."' Meanwhile, a large and growing landless
class of at least 400,000 people has been left without a piece of Kenya's
post-independence pie.13
IV.

ZIMBABWE'S CURRENT PROGRAMS

There are currently two major types of resettlement programs operating in Zimbabwe-intensive and accelerated resettlement. The intensive settlement program seems roughly comparable to Kenya's Million Acre Scheme. The program was originally designed to resettle
18,000 families over a period of three years, commencing in September
1980."'3 The target income for each family was set at Z$400 per family,
plus subsistence. This figure was reduced from an earlier proposal of
Z$1000. The legal basis for the program, like many other land programs in Zimbabwe, is a pre-independent government statute.12 4 This
statute, the Rural Land Act (cap. 155) of 1979, allows the Government
nearly total control over the purchase of new lands and the award of
permits to settlers.'35
Land for the program is to be purchased on a willing-seller, willing-buyer basis, with the cost, estimated at Z$60 million, to be shared
by the British and Zimbabwean Governments on an equal basis.' 36 The
130. See supra text accompanying note 102.
131. Wright, supra note 115, at 37.
132. See A. HAZLEWOOD, supra note 84, at 34-38; C. LEYS, supra note 85, at 115-16.
See also ILO Study, supra note 110, at 34-38.
133. HARBESON (1981), supra note 7, at 24.

134. See id. at 14. For example, the Tribal Trust Land of 1979 (pt. II, sec. 7.3), since
replaced by the Communal Land Act of 1982, specifically vested the TTLs in the control
of the President.
135. A new Land Acquisition Bill introduced in Parliament in 1983, but not yet

passed by mid-1984, would give the President the additional power to retake possession
of "under-utilized" and "derelict" land under certain circumstances. The Herald
(Harare), July 28, 1983, at 1.
136. Kinsey (1982), supra note 3, at 96. Actually, the cost of land purchases is esti-

mated to be slightly less than half that total, since development costs constitute the rest.
The British, therefore, can be said to be paying the entire cost of the land purchases.
This was an important concession won by the Patriotic Front at the Lancaster House
Conference; the Front maintained that an African government could not be required to
compensate Europeans for land which was illegally seized in the first place. See HARBESON (1981), supra note 7, at 25.
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money provided by Britain was solely in the form of a grant, unlike the
situation in Kenya. Prices for the land were to be roughly in accordance with 1976 prices and were to be individually negotiated by the
Land Selection Committee of the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and
Rural Development (MLRRD). In order for land to be suitable for
purchase under the program, it must be capable of exploitation, near
the communal areas, not presently cultivated or farmed, in a block
large enough to permit economic provision of services and infrastructure, and in an area already adequately served with basic infrastructure.3 7 By early 1983, nearly 2 million hectares had been purchased for
the program.'3 8
Selection of settlers is meant to include three basic categories of
people: refugees and people displaced by the war, the landless, and
those with insufficient land to maintain their families. Settlers must
also be between the ages of twenty-five and fifty, married or widowed
with dependents, and not employed in the formal sector. The ability of
prospective settlers to support themselves, as indicated by their possession of cattle, food stocks, and the like, will also be taken into consideration as a positive factor, although this seems to conflict with
some of the other criteria. 39
Once the settlers are selected, they must relinquish all rights in
their home TTLs. This requirement is more restrictive on the settlers
than similar requirements imposed in Kenya. Under the traditional
land tenure rules still prevailing in the TTLs, all inhabitants of a particular village are likely to retain certain rights. (In contrast, many of
the settlers in Kenya sought plots after being squeezed out of other
rights through the operation of Kenya's land registration program.) On
the other hand, this requirement probably cannot be effectively enforced and is considered unlikely to be adhered to by many settlers." '
Unlike Kenyan settlers, those in Zimbabwe will be able to occupy their
new plots without being encumbered by costly land purchase loans."1
137. Kinsey (1982), supra note 3, at 96. Although no land has been expropriated
without compensation, there were reports of pressure on farm owners to sell farms in

locations deemed strategic for the settlement program. Id. See also Kinsey (1983), supra
note 3, at 171. The same practice was rumored, but not proven, to have been employed
by the Kenyan Government in the 1960's. See J. HARBESON (1973), supra note 89, at 240.
138. Ross, Zimbabwe Pushing Ambitious-and Risky-Resettlement Plan, Wash.
Post, Feb. 5, 1983, at A17, col. 1.
139. See MINISTRY OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT, RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMME: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (Salisbury 1981), cited in Kinsey (1982),
supra note 3, at 97.
140. Kinsey (1982), supra note 3, at 98.
141. Settlers will have to take out certain crop loans, however, amounting to a much
smaller amount per family than those loans sustained in Kenya. HARBESON (1981), supra
note 7, at 29.
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In Zimbabwe, however, the ultimate nature of tenure to be held by the
settlers has not yet been resolved by the Government. Since the program began, settlers have simply been granted permits to occupy, cultivate and graze livestock in particular areas. These permits provide
neither freehold tenure nor a leasehold, but instead, merely grant permission to use the lands provided that certain conditions, such as payment of taxes, are met. If these conditions are not met, the minister
has sole discretion to revoke the permits with no recourse available to
settlers. 42
The Government has proposed four models of land settlement
under the intensive and accelerated programs. The first type, known as
Model A, has been, by far, the most prevalent model. Model A settlements allocate permits for five hectares of arable land, as well as individual residential plots in a village, to each family. Each village will
receive approximately fifty hectares per family of grazing land which is
to be utilized communally. 4 3 Altogether, Zimbabwean families received
considerably more land than Kenyan families in -the Million Acre
Scheme, but production estimates per acre of this land are considerably lower than in Kenya. Approximately 16,300 families were settled
under Model A schemes by April 1983.144

Model B settlements, which are comparable to small Algerian
Agrarian Revolution cooperatives, are designed for communal living
and cooperative farming. All property, land and equipment (except for
livestock) will be owned by the cooperative, and all members (in
groups of fifty to 200) are required to live together. This model was
meant to accommodate those with very limited means, such as refugees
and the landless young, by providing inputs such as farm equipment,
credit and livestock. Profits from the Model B settlements are meant
to be divided according to a formula developed by the settlers themselves. The Government would like this model to become the basis for
its long-term goal of a socialist transformation of the rural sector. " 5 It
was estimated that approximately 6,000 members were settled on
thirty-six cooperatives by mid-1983.146
Model C settlements are comparable to Kenya's shirika schemes.
They will consist of a large-scale central core estate, run by profes142. Id. at 27, 28.
143. This number was reduced from the average 65 hectares of grazing land allotted
to each family at the inception of the program, apparently because of the governmental
desire to further intensify the land resettlement program. See Kinsey (1983), supra note
3, at 179.
144. The Herald (Harare), Apr. 18, 1983 (supp.) at 9.
145. Kinsey (1983), supra note 3, at 175.
146. Id.

19831

ZIMBABWE'S RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM

sional managers and worked by the settlers, as well as small individual
plots for the settlers and communal grazing land. Model D settlements
were most recently approved for implementation on the least productive land areas. They are based on group ranching of livestock on former commercial ranches. Each family is also to receive a one-hectare
dry land arable plot and an irrigated vegetable garden of one-tenth of a
hectare. The most significant innovation envisaged for Model D settlements is that settlers will be permitted to take short-term employment
off the farm with the permission of the MLRRD and the settlement's
management committees. Only one Model C settlement and one pilot
Model D project were in operation as of mid-1983. 47
The second type of resettlement program, known as accelerated
resettlement, was established on an "emergency basis" in late 1981 following a directive from Mr. Mugabe. This program has some similarities to Kenya's Haraka schemes. It is meant to resettle large numbers
of squatters and other distressed people in a short period of time with
a minimum of infrastructure and prior planning. For at least the first
few years of the program, settlers are expected to utilize the admittedly overburdened infrastructure and social services of the nearby
communal areas. The Government intends to upgrade the accelerated
settlements to "proper" settlements when time permits. The planning
staff has already been preparing project reports with this objective in

mind. 148
The selection of sites for the accelerated settlements will be based
on interpretations of aerial photographs taken to identify arable land
and possible locations for villages. Settlers have often been picked for
the schemes through a system of self-selection. In many instances the
new schemes were implemented in areas where large numbers of squatters were already living, giving rise to the designation of this program
by planners as a "squatters' license. 1 49 The Government has not yet
released projections of how many settlers it plans to relocate under the
accelerated program. It seemed at first, based on the stated overall
target figure of 162,000 families by 1985 (18,000 of which were to come
from the intensive program of 1980 to 1983), that the Government
wanted to settle over 140,000 families on accelerated settlements. The
Government had already settled more than 19,500 families on intensive
resettlements by April, 1984, while only 5,500 families were settled
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 175-76.
Id. at 176-77.
Kinsey (1982), supra note 3, at 97.
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under the accelerated program. 5" This has led to the conclusion that
the accelerated program will not play as important a role as the Government planners originally expected.
V.

FUTURE PROBLEMS

At latest count, the Government has settled 25,000 families on well
over one million hectares of land, with settlements planned for at least
8,000 more.1 5' This achievement has been termed remarkable, since
Zimbabwe has already been able to convert as much land from white to
black control as was converted in the first fifteen years of Kenya's independence.' 5 2 A number of formidable obstacles face the Government,
however, as it proceeds with its program. The most obvious of these
problems is the cost of implementing the Government's plans. In order
to reach its goal of settling 162,000 families (on plots averaging fiftyfive hectares in size), the Government will have to purchase nine million hectares of land. This amounts to nearly sixty percent of the country's total commercial farming area. At the current prices paid by the
Government, these purchases would cost Z$228 million, far more than
the Z$ sixty million initially planned. When development costs are factored in, the total cost of resettling the planned number of families
would be an estimated Z$570 million. This is the equivalent of more
than eighty percent of average government revenue for the years 1978
to 1980.153
There is now little doubt that the Government will not reach its
announced goals. This projection is based on the expense involved, as
well as the fact that the Government has only been able to settle less
than 1,000 families a month in the past year, a rate which would have
to be multiplied tenfold to attain the stated goal.1 54 Even if the expenses of the program are eventually met, other problems are likely to
surface. First, a loss is likely to occur in overall agricultural production.
The Herald (Harare), Apr. 18, 1984 (supp.) at 12.
Id. See also ZIMBABWE DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION, ZIMBABWE: THE FACTS (No.
4: RESETTLING THE NATION) 4 (Aug. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Resettlement Fact Sheet].
152. Kinsey (1982), supra note 3, at 102.
153. Kinsey (1983), supra note 3, at 181. Kinsey seems to have overestimated the
development costs of the total program. He simply used the current ratio of development
costs to land costs (arising primarily from the intensive resettlement program) without
taking into account the Government's plan to resettle most future settlers on the significantly cheaper accelerated program.
154. See The Herald (Harare), supra note 150, at 12. The Government admits by
now that its plan to resettle 162,000 families by 1985 is "subject to financial constraints,
physical resources and other constraints which may obstruct the projected goal." Resettlement Fact Sheet, supra note 151, at 3.
150.
151.
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Even if the Government's production targets for the settlements are
met by the year 2000, this amount will account for only ninety-two
percent of the maize and twenty-five percent of the cotton lost from
the current production of the commercial sector, resulting in an annual
net foreign exchange loss of Z$ thirty-seven million. 155 If the target
rates of production are not met, which seems quite possible from the
various unrealistic assumptions made by the Government, the shortfall
may be even more serious. 15'
It is also questionable whether the gains to the new settlements in
income will outweigh the losses that will take place when jobs are lost
on the commercial farms. If the projected nine million hectares of land
are taken for the program, a recent estimate suggests that there will be
a loss of as many as forty percent of the jobs in the commercial sector,
or 119,000 jobs. 157 Moreover, it has been suggested that even if all of
the displaced workers in the commercial areas are among the 162,000
new settler families, their projected income of Z$400 per year would be
less than the 1982 agricultural minimum wage of Z$600 per year.'5 8
The resettlement program will also entail a large opportunity cost in
terms of the amount of lost resources, which would be better spent on
rural development of the communal areas. These areas were all but
ignored by the Rhodesian Government. Even if the planned number of
families is resettled, they only amount to twenty percent of the population of the communal areas. The continuation of the Government's
concentration of rural development resources in favor of the new settlers 5' may result in a policy that enables a small privileged group to
gain substantial advantages to the exclusion of the impoverished
majority.
Another potential cost of the resettlement program, particularly if
155. Kinsey (1983), supra note 3, at 188-89.
156. Some of the unrealistic assumptions are that the new settlers will have animaldrawn equipment although, in fact, it is believed that few eligible settlers have such
equipment. It is also assumed that there will be adequate labor, although the lack of
schools in resettlement areas and the unavailability of contract labor in the areas are
producing labor shortages. Id. at 183.
157. Id. at 185. This does not seem to have been the case, however, since the white
farmers have been selling poorer quality land. See Ashford, Tribal Land PressuresForce
Zimbabwe to Step Up Resettlement Pace, The Times (London), Apr. 7, 1981, at 7, col.
1.
158. Kinsey (1983), supra note 3, at 185-86. This estimate might be flawed, however,
by the fact that the projected income of the settlers was Z$400 per year over and above
subsistence needs for their families, while subsistence needs would normally have been
obtained out of the salaries of wage-earning husbands. Kinsey (1982), supra note 3, at
105.
159. Kinsey (1982), supra note 3, at 109.
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it is hastily implemented, is ecological. Numerous reports have been
received about squatters from the communal areas establishing crude
plots and planting crops in unused white-owned farmlands, hacking
60
down trees and generally devastating the land in the process.1 The
resettlement program, particularly the accelerated program, poses the
danger of causing irreparable harm to valuable land unless the settlers
are properly educated or otherwise deterred from damaging the land.
On the other hand, it should be recognized that squatters may be more
likely to damage the land if there is no resettlement program.
A second major issue for the Government is that of land tenure.
Important objectives to achieve in this category include allotting plots
of the optimal size and granting the proper degree of security of title,
each of which will have a strong bearing on the success or failure of the
overall program. A third major issue will be that of settler selection.
This issue concerns both the proper choice of settlers by the Government, as well as how the settlers will deal with each other and the
Government once they are selected. Finally, the Government will have
to determine how the overall programs will be administered and how
the related secondary rural activities, such as marketing and extension,
will be conducted.
VI.

APPLYING THE LESSONS OF ALGERIA AND KENYA

The experiences of Algeria's and Kenya's land resettlement and
reforms are replete with examples that Zimbabwe would be well served
to follow, as well as situations it should avoid. First, on the all-important issue of cost savings, an obvious option for the Government is simply to cease compensating white farmers for lands it nationalizes. If
such an action were taken, it would surely be a facial violation of section 16(1) of Zimbabwe's Constitution. Additionally, it would outrage
most adherents of the western legal principle of the sanctity of private
property that is enshrined in the United States Bill of Rights. It
should be recognized, however, that the Government's expropriation of
land without full or even partial compensation would not be totally
devoid of legal justification. The Government of Zimbabwe has at least
as good a claim as any other government in Africa to the land occupied
by whites since the colonial period. This land was taken, after all, from
its black occupants by conquest and fraud in the recent past for the
purpose of satisfying the land hunger of a handful of foreign fortune
seekers. The inequity that would be suffered by the small group of
white farmers from the confiscation of their land would also be bal160.

See N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1981, at A2, col. 1.
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anced, at least to some degree, by the fact that most of them had acquired and exploited their holdings under a system that prohibited access by Africans to their country's best land throughout the last half
century.
For these and other reasons, the Government has consistently refused to acknowledge that it is responsible for the compensation of
white farmers. Instead, it has placed the onus on Britain, the former
colonial power and mother country of many of the white farmers. Accordingly, Mr. Mugabe and other Zimbabwean officials have posited
the argument that the Patriotic Front only accepted the inclusion of
section 16 in the Constitution at the Lancaster House Conference on
the condition that the British Government finance land acquisitions
from white farmers. 1 The argument contains the explicit warning that
if foreign aid funds are exhausted and not replenished, 62 the Government would consider itself relieved from the strictures of section 16
and could choose another mode of payment, such as long-term government bonds.
The experiences of Algeria and Kenya suggest, however, that even
if the expulsion of the whites is achieved with little initial monetary
cost, the ultimate cost of such an action would be considerable. In Algeria, the decision to expropriate without compensation resulted in the
loss of all remaining credibility with the settlers. When the Government offered to allow settlers to return to manage their farms, none
returned. In Kenya, rumors that the Government might not compensate the settlers caused many of them to abandon or sabotage their
farms."6 3 The efficiency and management costs of losing the presence of
6
the whites have been substantial, particularly in Algeria.
Prospective losses to Zimbabwe due to white alienation might be
less than in the other two countries-partially because the settlers in
Kenya and Algeria had had more alternative opportunities abroad, and
161. This argument derives some support from the pronouncements of the Patriotic
Front during the constitutional conference, in which it denounced any obligation of the
people of Zimbabwe to compensate the European settlers. See Lancaster House Documents, supra note 22, at 490-91.
162. Indeed, recent news reports have suggested just such a possibility. See The
Times (London), Dec. 21, 1983, at 6, col. 6 (United States aid to Zimbabwe for 1984 cut
in half). See also Rich, Zimbabwe-only teething troubles?, WORLD TODAY 500, 505
(1983) (difficulties in securing the release of British aid).
163. See WORLD BANK KENYA REPORT, supra note 120, at 473; Harbeson (1971),
supra note 85, at 240-41.
164. Another potential cost likely to be incurred from the cessation of direct compensation to the white farmers is the loss of business confidence in the investment climate.
Increased white urban emigration and possible reductions in assistance from the international financial community might also occur.
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partially because Zimbabwe has far more educated and skilled citizens
than either Kenya or Algeria had at independence. Still, the consensus
in government circles seems to be that Africans are not yet ready to
take over the commercial farms. 65 This can be seen from Mr.
Mugabe's efforts to reassure the white farmers of his support. 66 Given
this continuing need for the presence of white commercial farmers,
Zimbabwe can benefit from Kenya's mistakes by closely monitoring the
prices paid to farmers who sell and making sure that the MLRRD does
not negotiate "sweetheart" deals with the white farmers. 6"
A second means of cutting costs is embodied in Zimbabwe's accelerated resettlement plan. Kenya used its similar program, the Haraka
schemes, for a relatively small number of settlers. Algeria used a modified version of this program in its Agrarian Revolution. As was mentioned above, Kenya's Haraka schemes seemed to be its most successful resettlement program. In spite of receiving high marks from the
ILO 6 s and the World Bank,16 the program was discontinued by the
Kenyan Government. The discontinuance of the program was reputedly due to the demise of the populist opposition political party, the
KPU, and the fastidiousness of the land planners at the Department of
Settlement who disliked the schemes' unplanned nature and "scruffy"
appearance.170 Neither reason seems sufficiently compelling to warrant
advising against implementing the program in Zimbabwe.
There is little doubt that certain difficulties of the Haraka
schemes in Kenya will occur in Zimbabwe. The land allocated for this
program in Kenya was dry, marginal land, and it was not uncommon
for the rains in these areas to fail entirely, causing the settlers to abandon their plots and seek sustenance elsewhere.17 1 Zimbabwe's accelerated resettlements also tend to be in remote areas of the country, unsupported by any water facilities. 7 2 Because, as events of the past two
years have shown, drought can be as severe a problem in Zimbabwe as
in Kenya, settlers under the accelerated program seem most likely to
165. See HARBESON (1981), supra note 7, at 45.
166. See Kumbula, Mugabe's Balancing Act, APR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 67, 68;
Ashford, How Zimbabwe's White Farmers Came to Support "Good old Bob," The Times
(London), Apr. 8, 1981, at 7, col. 1.
167. The country has tried to control land speculation (which probably raised the
price of land in Kenya) by passing regulations stating that the Government will have
preemptive rights to buy all land put on the market. See The Herald (Harare), Nov. 23,
1982, at 1.
168. See ILO Study, supra note 110, at 173.
169. See WORLD BANK KENYA REPORT, supra note 120, at 475.
170. C. HOLTHAM & A. HAZLEWOOD, supra note 92, at 117.
171. Id.
172. Kinsey (1983), supra note 3, at 177.
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abandon their plots. 17 Additionally, to the extent that settlers on the

accelerated schemes remain on their plots, the trend in Kenya of a
high percentage of internal consumption and lower sales rates on the
Haraka schemes 17 4 may be repeated in Zimbabwe.

These problems, however, do not appear to outweigh the benefits
of the accelerated schemes. These settlements are mostly new farms in
remote and presumably little-used areas; they provide for large numbers of people who have few other means of support. In addition, the
actual lack of planning for these schemes might prevent Algerian-type
problems such as state paternalism, red tape and corruption. Instead,
the high self-motivation stemming from the desperate circumstances of
many of Kenya's smallholders may be duplicated on the accelerated
schemes. The proper role of these schemes seems limited to the more
remote or lesser-used areas. Severe potential land damage and losses of
production are possible if unplanned and unsupervised programs are
implemented in the country's more fertile areas. Given the large number of settlers and acreage the Government wishes to place in accelerated schemes, the program, if implemented as planned, may well pose
these dangers.
The experiences of Kenya and Algeria might help to dissuade
Zimbabwe from trying two "resettlement" models used in these countries, both of which have been suggested for use in Zimbabwe. The first
of these models, the opening up of white farms for purchase on the free
market, was recommended by a number of liberal white and conservative black groups prior to independence and was implemented by the
Rhodesian Government as the "land reform" of the Land Tenure Act
of 1977."1 This type of land disposal offers the advantage of less government involvement (and expense) in the planning and operation of
these farms. On the other hand, Kenya's experience with this model of
resettlement has shown it to be a financial nightmare. Also, it is a possible first step to a stratified rural African society which Zimbabwe's
leaders seem anxious to avoid at all costs."'
The other model suggested for Zimbabwe is the state farm. Judging from Algeria's experiences with its "self-managed" farms,
173. The drought of 1982-84 (see infra text accompanying notes 207-09) caused
thousands of settlers to leave their homes to look for work on commercial farms. See The
Herald (Harare), July 13, 1982, at 3. Presumably, the problem of the drought, as well as
the difficulty of evicting squatters, are the two major causes of the slow pace of the
accelerated resettlement program to date. See Kinsey (1983), supra note 3, at 177.
174. C. HOLTHAM & A. HAZLEWOOD, supra note 92, at 117-18.
175. See RIDDELL MONOGRAPH, supra note 13, at 17-19.
176. See GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE, GROWTH WITH EQUITY: AN EcoNOMIC POLICY STATEMENT 5 (1981).
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Zimbabwe would be poorly advised to attempt such a model. Although
state farms may have used capital-intensive methods of production
better than small individual farms, they seemed to stifle individual incentive and serve as centers of corruption, resulting in stagnant levels
of production and a loss of employment opportunities. Algeria itself
seems to have recognized the unwieldiness of its state farm organiza1
tions. It has already divided its 2,300 farms into 5,000 to 6,000 units "
78
and is reportedly considering the dismantling of its state-run sector.
Of course, state farms or variants thereof cannot be categorically ruled
out for all countries in all situations. It seems, however, that the same
distrust of the state, lack of trained management and inappropriate
use of labor that pervaded the Algerian system would be present in
79
Zimbabwe.
Models B and C of Zimbabwe's intensive resettlement program
might ultimately offer more promise for the new nation. Indeed, if
these or other large-scale models are not utilized, the country has little
hope of being able to take advantage of the improvements and capital
equipment brought in by the whites for its new settlers. In each model,
provision is made for substantial local control of decisionmaking and
sharing of the farms' profits. A warning is in order for these two types
of schemes, however, based on Algeria's self-managed farms and cooperatives as well as Kenya's shirika schemes. In each, it appears that
farm members have been deprived of meaningful participation in decisionmaking by paternalistic government managers. 80 Considering that
most peasants in each country have been wary of joining the cooperatives in the first place because of a preference for private ownership
and distrust of the Government, it is not surprising that this type of
paternalism has caused disillusionment among the members. It has
even led to abandonment of the schemes by the settlers, as in the case
of Algeria's Socialist Villages, despite the fact that few better economic
opportunities existed elsewhere in the rural economy.""'
In Zimbabwe, the same type of distrust of government is readily
visible. 8 " Strong preference for individual tenure exists as well. Hostility to government agricultural programs was particularly strong in
177. Arabia (1983), supra note 69.
178. See Randal, supra note 75, at A18, col. 4.
179. See HARBESON (1981), supra note 7, at 31, 33.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61, 84 and 141-45.
181. See supra text accompanying note 86.
182. See HARaESON (1981), supra note 7, at 31. See also Ross, supra note 138, at A17.
For example, it has recently been reported that many peasants living in the communal
areas would prefer to remain landless than to be resettled in government-sponsored
Model B cooperatives. The Herald (Harare), Mar. 30, 1984, at 13.
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Matabeleland, home of the minority Ndebele tribe,'8 3 and appears to
have increased after the Army's recent bloody campaign to suppress
the mostly Ndebele dissident factions. 4 The Government appears to
have chosen wisely to respond to these popular pressures by making
membership in cooperatives voluntary, rather than mandatory. The
Government was said to have been influenced in this decision by the
disappointing performance of Tanzania's ujamaa program.' 85 Its administration of the cooperatives seems to have emphasized government
control over the peasants, however, and this trend could bring trouble
if it continues.1 8

Zimbabwe should also heed the warning provided by Kenya's and
Algeria's experience with people thrown together by the circumstance
of being on the same settlement or land purchase cooperative. In Kenya, a total absence of a sense of shared purpose deriving from these
haphazard groupings has been noted by some observers. This has impeded the efficiency of high-density schemes as well as large grouppurchased farms. 187 The Zimbabwean Government has declared its desire to include community facilities, health clinics and schools in the
new intensive resettlement schemes, as well as to integrate the district
councils of the communal areas with the new settlements in order to
provide local political participation.'8 8 The Government has been reported to have placed "remarkably little emphasis" on the importance
of community and consultation with settlers during the resettlement
process. Instead, there has been a tendency to "resettle numbers rather
than people" while providing no local political participation."8 9 Judging
from Algeria's experiences, in which facilities similar to those contemplated by Zimbabwe were provided, but where little sense of community was engendered, the Government will have to provide more opportunities for political participation in addition to these facilities.
Kenya's and Algeria's experiences also provide guidance on the
problematic issues of settler selection and security of title. Algeria can
be said to have practiced a type of self-selection on the self-managed
183. See Sanger, Zimbabwe at Two, INT'L PERSP., July-Aug. 1982, at 29.
184. One of the tactics used by the dissidents in Matabeleland has been to attack
resettlement villages. See, e.g., The Citizen (Johannesburg), July 18, 1983, at 18.
185. Meister, supra note 12, at 29. The Government has even made settler membership in cooperative marketing and production societies voluntary. This takes the free
enterprise mode one step further than Kenya. See id.
186. See Bratton, supra note 1, at 472; see also Harbeson (1971), supra note 85, at
249 (description of Kenya's problems when cooperative societies were imposed on the
peasants without adequate protection).
187. J. HARBESON (1973), supra note 89, at 259.
188. HARBESON (1981), supra note 7, at 28-29.
189. Kinsey (1982), supra note 3, at 108.
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schemes, accomplished by laborers on the French estates simply closing off access to the estates by outsiders. 9 ' This self-selection provided
an insular and stagnant work force, as evidenced by the fact that by
1980, over fifty percent of the workers on the self-managed farms were
over sixty years old.' 9' In Kenya, on the other hand, data from the
high- and low-density schemes indicates that the high-density settlers
have been more highly motivated, which made up in large part for
their lack of experience and wealth. These findings appear to vindicate
Zimbabwe's policy of giving preference to destitute and landless settlers. On the other hand, it should be noted that even on Kenya's highdensity schemes a considerable number of settlers had had prior experience with other landholdings, or retained other employment while
farming.'9 2
The security of land tenure given to Zimbabwe's new settlers differs from that given in both Algeria and Kenya. In Algeria, those individual settlers under Agrarian Revolution programs who were given
land not suitable for cooperatives were given freehold title. 193 There is
little data available to gauge the success of this program, except to
note that the private sector grew on an overall basis by a larger amount
than the self-managed and Agrarian Revolution sectors (the latter of
which only includes cooperatives) through the late 1970's. 94 New settlers in Kenya eventually were offered title to their land, but only after
certain conditions were met, such as repayment of thirty-year loans. In
Zimbabwe, even this amount of security is not given to the settlers.
Instead, there is merely a permit which is revocable at the sole discretion of the MLRRD.
The Government presents compelling reasons for not wishing to
grant freehold tenure to settlers, at least in the early stages of the program. The reasons include insuring that the new settlers will be conscientious, preventing wealthier rural dwellers from acquiring the assets
of poorer ones and keeping the Government's options open to promote
alternative land distribution systems."' 5 The mere newness of the program and the untested quality of the settlers and the lands for inten190. Actually, the Algerian farm workers were not entirely successful at their task.
State farms are still experiencing a squatter problem with individuals who moved onto
these farms at independence and have refused to move off. See Al Sha'b (Algiers), Apr.
7, 1981, at 5, translated in J.P.R.S. 78,145.
191. Arabia (1983), supra note 69.
192. HARBESON (1981), supra note 7, at 30.
193. Blutstein, supra note 26, at 170.
194. Karsenty, supra note 66, at 5. Notably, the other two sectors received more assistance than the private sector. See Arabia (1983), supra note 69.
195. HARBESON (1981), supra note 7, at 32, 40.
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sive settlement seems to justify the first reason for not giving tenure,
while Kenya's experience with wealthy Africans driving poor Africans
off the land seems to justify the second. The Government has considered several ways of ultimately reallocating land in the commercial sector, including massive irrigation projects. 9 6 Mr. Mugabe has stated
that the Government's ultimate goal is to settle 350,000 families in the
commercial areas,'19 7 possibly on the new irrigation projects. If such
plans ever come to fruition, it will probably be necessary to subdivide
the fifty-five-hectare plots presently allotted to each settler family.
A number of criticisms have been levelled against the lack of tenure security in Zimbabwe's program. One of the criticisms is that the
discretion inherent in the allocation system makes it open to political
abuse and corruption. While this may be true, it seems likely that a
system that gives freehold tenure would be no less open to abuse. This
is illustrated by Kenya's notorious "Z" plots, 100-acre plots with plantation homes given to political cronies of the government leadership in
the 1960's.'
Another ground for criticism of Zimbabwe's resettlement program
is more deserving of attention; the present system, with its arbitrary
revocation of permits and lack of compensation for any improvements
on the land, may discourage settlers from committing themselves entirely to developing the new settlements. Indeed, the fear of losing the
security of whatever meager land tenure they possessed in the communal areas was one of the major reasons for the initial hesitancy of many
settlers in Zimbabwe to enter the schemes.' 99 The Government could
accommodate its long-term interests, while at the same time provide
additional security to the settlers, if it provided compensation for permanent improvements and a review procedure prior to revocation of
settlement permits. In addition to giving settlers a greater feeling of
permanence, security devices would also help to stem the environmental degradation that has taken place on squatters' plots.
In fact, the Government of Zimbabwe finally seems to have realized that its initial policy of granting only revocable permits does not
196. Sanger, supra note 183, at 29.
197. Robert Mugabe, Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, AFR. REP., Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 4, 8
(interviewed by Margaret A. Novicki).
198. See Wasserman, Continuity and Counterinsurgency:The Role of Land Reform
in Decolonizing Kenya, 1962-70, 7 CAN. J. AFR. STUD. 133, 145-46 (1973). Widely reported stories of fortunes amassed in Kenya from speculation by political grantees of
land also lend credence to the notion that the grant of freehold tenure in the early stages
of a land resettlement program may be more likely to lead to abuses than a method
utilizing conditional grants of land.
199. HARBESON (1981), supra note 7, at 31.
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provide satisfactory security for settlers. The MLRRD announced a
new policy in 1983, enabling settlers to receive long-term, non-transferable leases after an initial period of three to five years, provided the
Ministry has determined that the settlers have a high probability of
continuing as efficient producers. 00° However, the Ministry also announced that as a general rule, it will not issue titles until after the
land reform measures are completed. 0 1
Feelings of commitment to the new settlements might also be engendered by giving each settler a heavy loan burden to meet before
receiving title, as was done in Kenya. Zimbabwe was probably wise to
avoid taking this step, since the debt for the land in Kenya was often
so heavy in the first few years that new settlers on high-density
schemes had an average negative cash income after loan payments
were made.20 2 The consequences of this negative income were that
farmers were often unable to make new capital investments, which in
turn made the loans even harder to repay in following years.103 There is
still a good deal of sense in giving settlers some income for maintenance, however, and the Government of Zimbabwe is doing this by requiring relatively small development loans to be paid back by each
settler.
The experiences of Algeria and Kenya suggest other policy choices
that may be useful for Zimbabwe. First, both Kenya's experiences and
projections by Zimbabwe's experts indicate that most of Zimbabwe's
productive white-owned farms are likely to lose much of their productivity if they are divided into small African-owned plots. Moreover, Algeria's experience shows that an immediate transition into large "selfmanaged" farms is also fraught with peril, especially in view of the
tendency of government bureaucrats to become involved in the farms'
management. Zimbabwe might, therefore, be best off if it delays conversion of the most productive white farms and concentrates for the
time being on abandoned or underutilized land. Much of its current
resettlement program actually appears headed in this direction, which
200. The Herald (Harare), July 28, 1983, at 1.
201. Id.
202. J. HARBESON (1973), supra note 89, at 294-95. The weight of the loan burden is
more apparent when it is considered that perhaps fewer than half of the loans were being
paid back on schedule. See supra text accompanying notes 109-10.
203. The Kenyan Government itself seems to have acknowledged the error of these
loans. The Government announced a two-year moratorium in 1967 for new settlers, and
announced in its 1974-87 Development Plan that it was considering not charging interest
on arrears. See C. HOLTHAM & A. HAZLEWOOD, supra note 92, at 122.
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may be a fortuitous result of the hard economic times presently afflicting the country." 4
At the same time, the Government might take measures aimed at
the ultimate transfer of the white farms to broadly based black control
while retaining the farms' productivity. One possibility, initially proposed before independence but not yet acted upon, would be to give
commercial farmers incentives to work toward greater worker participation and training of new management. 20 5 Farmers might be given
greater compensation for their farms if they cooperate in training new
managers or assist in resettlement of new farmers in nearby underutilized areas. A progressive land tax might be imposed for the purposes of
encouraging divestment of underutilized farmland, with deductions or
credits built in for those farmers who implement a management training program. Finally, a land ownership ceiling might be imposed, as
was done in Algeria's Agrarian Revolution. The ceiling itself would operate as an incentive for divestment, while exceptions could be built in
for those farmers with a viable management training program."'
VII.

CONCLUSION

Whether Zimbabwe's resettlement program achieves its objectives
of broad redistribution and growth of production remains to be seen.
Although the program got off to an excellent start in 1981 and was
helped by a bumper crop in maize, it has been hindered severely by the
continuous drought from 1982 to 1984 which has ravaged all of southern Africa.20 7 The drought in Zimbabwe, described as "the worst
drought of the century,"2 08 cut the maize crop by more than two-thirds,
204. See The Sunday Mail (Harare), Sept. 4, 1983, at 3. One element of the Government's recent austerity program, forced upon it by the general world recession and severe domestic drought, has been a drastic cut in the budget for the resettlement program, with a decrease in the land acquisition budget from $25 million in 1983 to $2
million in 1985. Frankel, An African Success Story, Wash. Post, Nov. 20, 1984, at Al,
col. 1; see also Rich, supra note 162, at 505 and infra text accompanying notes 207-10.
The hardship caused by the drought might also be fortuitous for Zimbabwe in one other
sense-it appears to have dampened the urge to own land among prospective settlers, all
of whom obviously cannot possibly be accommodated. Consequently, Zimbabwe may
have lost some of the political imperative for rapid change in land ownership that was
responsible for some of the worst abuses of the resettlement program in Kenya.
205. See RIDDELL STUDY, supra note 2, at 119.
206. A land acquisition ceiling without any of the foregoing recommended incentives
can be found in the new Land Tenure Bill. The Bill was introduced in Parliament in
1983, but has not yet been passed as of mid-1984. See The Herald (Harare), July 28,
1983, at 1.
207. See Southern Africa's Drought: Nature's Curse, man's folly, EcoNomisT, Feb.
11, 1984, at 70-71.
208. The Chronicle (Bulawayo), June 22, 1983, at 1.
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from 1.8 million tons in 1981 to an estimated one million tons in

1984.209 As a result, the country has become a net importer of food for
the first time in recent history, and was forced to seek drought relief
assistance for at least half of its rural population, including 120 million
dollars in foreign food aid.210 It is, nonetheless, very encouraging that
despite the drought, Zimbabwe's peasant farmers were able to market
325,000 metric tons of maize in 1984, accounting for one-third of the
country's total crop.211
In addition to the factors discussed in this paper, the program's
success will depend on a large number of other variables, many of
which will be outside the control of Zimbabwe's land planners. These
variables include: whether the drought will continue; whether particular crops (including tobacco and cotton) are amenable to widespread
peasant cultivation in Zimbabwe's soils and climate; whether the Government will succeed in its industrialization plans and in attracting
foreign investment for surplus labor; and whether the Mugabe government can retain its initial popularity after the latest violent episodes in
Matabeleland.
Zimbabwe's land settlement program is a generally well thoughtout policy for the achievement of social and philosophical goals in difficult circumstances. The country does appear to have learned a great
deal from the Kenyan experience; it has adopted some of the most appropriate aspects of Kenya's system while rejecting the least successful
aspects. The Government might be well advised to study the Algerian
experience, however, if it wishes not to duplicate the bureaucratization
and corruption which has pervaded that country's agricultural system.
On the whole, as long as the country retains its flexibility and willingness to learn from its own and its neighbors' mistakes, Zimbabwe may
be able to achieve a substantial degree of the growth and equity sought
by its leaders.

209. Southern Africa's Drought, supra note 207, at 70; Frankel, supra note 204, at
A10. The actual 1984 harvest compares very favorably with the 500,000 ton yield predicted early in the year by some observers. See Southern Africa's Drought, supra note
207, at 70.
210. Knight, PoliticalConsolidation in Zimbabwe, CURRENT HIST., Mar. 1984, at 110,
112; see also The Herald (Harare), June 21, 1983, at 1.
211. Frankel, supra note 204, at A10, cols. 1-2.

